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Attached memo was delivered  
by Claire of our FE Division.

She said that [REDACTED] 25X1A  
does not want this memo to  
have the usual distribution  
which yours receive--pre-  
ferring that only you see  
the attached.

① D/DCI — RL  
② Go for file

(DATE)

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29 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 29 April Meeting of the Indochina Group

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1. [REDACTED] reported that the paper on Hanoi's courses of action in the next year or so was very well received by the Senior Review Group; Kissinger, Laird, et al. have commented favorably and the Director is pleased, both with the product and the reaction to it. (For what it's worth, I find myself quite out of step with these observers--none of whom are likely to have read the paper thoroughly. I think we could have produced a better paper, that the tone of its first section conveys a misleading impression of Hanoi's terms for negotiating and that even though the Agency had to produce what was requested, we could have done more to stress that Hanoi's ability to fight cannot be measured adequately by rough estimates of supply and manpower requirements. This is an old, old story, of course, and [REDACTED] assures me that during the SRG discussion of the paper he pointed out that the model was unrealistic and in some portions--especially those dealing with Cambodia--the estimates should be ignored.

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2. [REDACTED] reported there is more traffic [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] about the growing problem of morale among [REDACTED]

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3. [REDACTED] said there were still problems with the language of the net judgment in the estimate on South Vietnam's prospects through 1975. ONE wanted to make a no-better-than-even estimate; OCI and State agreed. The military services wanted a better-than-even judgment. Meanwhile, the Director told a number of us earlier this week that he did not like the idea of laying any kind of odds on the GVN's survival and that he would be happier if the estimate simply conveyed the idea that the survival of the GVN over the next five years is "by no means assured." The matter was to have been discussed at the USIB today.

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4. [REDACTED] noted that a Cambodian version of the Hanoi intentions paper is being prepared. He suggested that OER get its contributions out as soon as possible so that he could take OER's numbers and estimates and write some sensible prose describing the situation and prospects in Cambodia. [REDACTED] seemed to agree with this procedure. This paper will not be a CIA product; what is written will be a contribution to a Defense Department draft. OER plans to rely heavily on the numbers and options already worked up for Cambodia. Everyone seems to recognize that estimates for Cambodia are even softer than those for Vietnam.

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5. [REDACTED] painted a gloomy picture of the current situation in Cambodia. [REDACTED] has been asked to produce a candid assessment of the situation, including comments on the recent defection of two FANK companies, the economic picture, and the political outlook. [REDACTED] recommends that a paper be prepared soon for the Director warning of the bleak outlook in Cambodia. [REDACTED] noted that he plans to produce an annex for the PDB on the same subject, perhaps next week.

[REDACTED]

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Chief, Vietnam Task Force

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